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Abstract This paper would like to explore the return of a new “culturalist approach” 
to language, particularly in relation to visual representation and the spatial 
dimension. First, we will present the concepts of vision and space as recently 
described by cognitive linguistics (eg Lakoff, Johnson, with the idea of 
“embodiment”, or Talmy). Secondly, we will investigate the links between this 
cognitive linguistic trend and the “culturalist” point of view, especially in its recent 
versions (for example, Palmer). Comparisons have been proposed with some models 
that come from the neuro-mathematics of perception and visual cognition (these 
investigations are linked to a return to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology; an 
influence that is also relevant inside cognitive linguistics). Finally we will try to 
highlight some possible convergence points of these studies. 
Keywords: Vision, spatial categories, cultural linguistics, semiotics, embodiment 
1. Language, vision, space: an open issue. 
The aim of this paper is to consider some aspects of the relationship between 
language, space and vision, emphasizing, however, the return of a “culturalist” 
hypothesis. It is possibile that the concept of “vision” may sound too general, or not 
directly related to issues relevant to the study of language. It is important to clarify 
this issue: how can we think about vision from the point of view of language? Firstly, 
today we can think about vision in relation to the bodily dimension and its relation 
with space. This is the common response from linguistics, semiotics and cognitive 
studies, particularly in recent decades (see, for example, even through different 
approaches, VARELA, THOMPSON, ROSCH 1991); JACKENDOFF 1996; 
LEVINSON 1996; LAKOFF, JOHNSON 1999; FONTANILLE 2004; VIOLI 1997). 
Indubitably, during last decades, the concept of “embodiment” has gradually and 
increasingly broadened in its various meanings.  
In particular (this point which is important for us here) the study of the connections 
between neuro-physiological mechanisms and perceptual categories is an 
increasingly relevant field of research for cognitive and linguistic studies. The main 
purpose of this line of research is to try to understand not only in which way the 
neural correlates interact with “high level” perceptual mechanisms (that is to say, not 
only the recognition of contours, colors, objects, etc.) but also with abstract 
categories and concepts (see, LIUZZA 2011). We would also like to formulate a 
hypothesis regarding how these sensorial systems are linked to cognitive schemas 
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organizations. These schemas, concerning the lines of research we are referring to, 
are built up starting from the perception we have of our own body, within an 
environment (see, among others, LAKOFF 1987; LAKOFF, JOHNSON 1980; 1999; 
VARELA, THOMPSON, ROSCH 1991)1. 
 
 
2. An intersection between the Cultural, Phenomenological, and Experientialist 
Turn.  
As is well known, one of the theories central to this research started with renewal of 
interest in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology (LAKOFF, JOHNSON 1999; VARELA, 
THOMPSON, ROSCH, op. cit.; see also, CARMAN, HANSEN 2005). There seem 
to be two main moments of this “rediscovery”. Firstly, the famous idea that was 
defined as “body chiasm” by Merleau-Ponty (1945) in his re-discussion of Husserl's 
thought. That is, that perception begins through and by our ability to see ourselves in 
this world, but also stems from our being and feeling ourselves as a body and 
through this bodily dimension.  
What was taken from Merleau-Ponty is a line of studies in which the bodily 
dimension acquires a central role in cognition. As well known, this new approach has 
been proposed (with intersections, and reciprocal references) both by linguists and 
philosophers such as Lakoff and Johnson (and, more broadly, in linguistics and 
cognitive studies, from the early '80s, with the work of Talmy (e.g., 2000)) and a 
biologist, neuroscientist and epistemologist such as Varela. The body is no longer 
just a “medium” (the idealist and internalistic position) or a conglomeration of 
“sensors” (the behaviorist and empiricist position) with a “central processing unit 
data” (the computationalist and symbolic position), but becomes an active locus for 
the production of “figures”, to be considered primarily as “image-schemas”, 
according, for instance, to Lakoff (1987) and Lakoff and Johnson (1999): recurrent 
patterns by which we represent (interpreting and making sense) relationship between 
our body and recurrent situations. According to this reasoning, figures (produced by 
the body and embodied processes) play a constructive role in building perception and 
cognition. Figures of the body (at the same time developed by bodily dimension) 
work as “active filters” in matching, constructing, shaping the world’s reality (see 
also, FONTANILLE 2004). While we cannot further develop this point here, it is 
interesting to remember that there seem to be some similarities between this version 
of “vision” and other constructivist philosophies, such as Goodman’s philosophical 
conception, as well as with some developments of the european school of structural 
and narrative semiotics, notably with Greimas2. 
Starting from the acting and being of the body (and, at the same time, its perceiving) 
in the world, schemas (image, sensory-motor) are created; but, according to this 
                                                           
1
 For an overview of this discussion, we would like also refer to: BORGHI, MONTANARI, SARTI 
2008. 
2
 See, GOODMAN 1954. According to Greimas and the scholars of structural semiotics (see 
GREIMAS 1983; GREIMAS, COURTÉS 1979; see also, FONTANILLE 1999; 2004), there were 
some basic common points of departure between “generative Semantics” (the 1970s seminal proposal 
by Lakoff and other Chomsky’s former students debating with Chomsky about the idea of deep 
structure) and, later, some issues of cognitive linguistics, and structural semiotics: particularly 
concerning the multi level and compositional structure of production of meanings and contents. It is 
interesting to notice that structural semantics and semiotics have developed some similar ideas about 
“figures” seen as sets, configurations of “proprioceptive”, “exteroceptive” and “interoceptive” 
semantic basic components (see, GREIMAS, COURTÉS, op. cit.). 
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hypothesis, these same schemas serve as models and “filters” for perception. The 
second element that these studies take from Merleau-Ponty is related to the problem 
of what we could define as the generalization of the inherently synaesthetic 
perception. Of course, the theme of synesthesia is a much older and wider issue (see, 
e.g., MAZZEO 2005), however, what is affirmed in this “revival” of phenomenology 
(in what Lakoff and Johnson define as the field of metaphorical patterns) is to 
conceive cognitive dimension (as well as perceptual one) as governed by these 
general patterns: underneath specific percepts. For Merleau-Ponty, the body (in 
finding itself “touching” and sensitive to itself) is seen while acting, and it acts as it 
observes itself. There is a close linkage, as Merleau-Ponty says, between vision and 
movement. 
Hence the interest once again in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, even by the researchers 
who developed the hypothesis (very “fashionable”, also, today, in its public opinion 
narrative) of “mirror neurons”3. But beyond this specific point, in rediscovering of 
Merleau-Ponty, there is this idea concerning the formation of deep perceptual and 
sensory-motor patterns. 
For instance, Lakoff and Johnson “container schema”, proposed in several occasions 
(see especially LAKOFF AND JOHNSON 1999), is a classic example of a 
“schema”. Lakoff and Johnson state (1999: 380): «Containers are image schemas 
with logical constraints built into their very structure [...] they are [...] 
conceptualizations that we impose upon space.». 
This idea concerns the building up of general schemas from basic metaphorical 
patterns and images. However, once again, this process is “embodied” because 
patterns are developed from features and relationships regarding our bodily 
dimension. Let us take a very common example, related to the fact that I can claim to 
be “in” or “out” in relation to a space, as well as more or less close to a spacial 
boundary. At the same time, I could use this schema as a more general metaphor 
related to being, for instance, “out of the game”, or even “crazy.” (in italian: “fuori di 
testa”, “off one’s head”). 
Beyond these simplifications (and beyond the specific example of the container, or 
containment, schema), for Lakoff and Johnson, these kinds of patterns (image 
schemas as regularities produced from typical bodily’s situations) are fundamental 
because they constitute the bases not only for specific utterances but also possibly for 
entire cultural traditions, such as, for example, the western civilization4. But, are 
those schemas5 located in a “given culture”? 
                                                           
3
 Given the vast number of publications and research on this topic, we refer in particular to: 
RIZZOLATTI, FOGASSI, WELSH 2006; RIZZOLATTI, SINIGAGLIA 2006. See also a recent PhD 
thesis of Psychology, in cognitive neuroscience, which reviews the status of this research, in particular 
as regards the issue of social behavior in the relationship between attention and social and spatial 
effects of resonance and sensory-motor effects (LIUZZA 2011). 
4
 Indeed, according to Lakoff and Johnson (ib.) the same Aristotelian logic, the categories and the 
rules of logical inference, would be based on conceptual-spatial schema such as the “Container”. We 
prefer to suspend the discussion concerning this idea because it would lead us too far, touching topics 
such as historical and cultural relativism, the forms of a given culture and mentality, etc. Of course, 
these are precisely the fundamental themes of “culturalism”, but they merit to be treated in a more 
systematic and detailed way. 
5
 In any case, the idea of “image schemas” is conceived by Lakoff and Johnson as the development 
and integration of other concepts proposed by semantics and cognitive sciences, particularly that of 
the “conceptual schemas” and “frames” proposed by Fillmore from the '70s, or, later, those of 
Langacker, Holland and Quinn, more or less during the same years in which Lakoff and Johnson, and 
perhaps in a wider perspective, Talmy, developed their concepts (see, PALMER, cit.: 63-66). 
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Can the return to a “cultural” approach and a “cultural turn” in linguistic studies play 
a new role? About the finding of a connection between cognitive and perception 
studies, linguistics, visual and cultural studies. 
According to many linguistic and semiotic studies as well as in cognitive science 
(see, i.e., GREIMAS 1983; FONTANILLE 1999; LAKOFF, JOHNSON, cit.; 
TALMY 2000), the way we speak about space, including the grammar we use, has a 
link to the way we see and perceive the space itself (PALMER, cit.). But the issue 
seems to be more general. 
For a discussion about the link between space and language we must refer also to 
LEVINSON, i.e., 1996, 2003) in which he proposes a wide and very deep review and 
discussion of hypothesis concerning this issue (see also JACKENDOFF 1996; 
BLOOM 1996). According to Levinson, discussing different hypothesis (space 
categories are “absolutely” embodied, or, are they strictly linked to our sensorial 
capacities?) anthropological and linguistic findings seem to show that spatial 
categories are “quite divergent” across cultures (ib.: 353-355). But how do these 
findings deal with the “uniqueness” of our bodily experience? According to the 
discussion proposed, Levinson (ib.: 357), quoting Poincaré, indicates «Absolute 
space is nonsense, and it is necessary for us to begin by referring space to a system of 
axes invariably bound to the body.» Indeed, there are “cognitive styles” through 
which individuals deal with space in different cultures. For Levinson there is a cross-
cultural and cross-linguistic variation concerning parameters expressing position in 
space (for instance, in the use of deixis, Levinson stresses the fact that some 
languages, such as some papuasian languages, use the marking not only of horizontal 
distance (from speaker and addressee) but also of vertical one  (not only “far away” 
but something like “far away below”). These variations could also be typical of 
different kinds of “frames of reference”, such as the systems of relative or absolute 
locations. For these reasons the conception of body as an “absolute center” of 
language and cognition could be doubtful. Thus Levinson suggests we could explore 
two main possible research programs: the first, language as a tool that shows 
“prominent” categories; the second, the effects of language and cognition in specific 
“sites” and cultural situations (ib.: 375). 
 
 
3. Culturalist paradigm and perception. 
And here we stress again the importance of a return to a culturalist “paradigm” (as 
we might say in a perhaps generic sense, yet useful here for this discussion). This 
idea, obviously, is not very far from Whorf’s idea and the so-called Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis. In this respect, Palmer (1996), in his effective and anticipatory synthesis 
that has supported and prepared the “return” of “cultural linguistics”, remembers 
something that apparently sounds like a paradox: Benjamin L. Whorf, known as the 
“noble father” of culturalism, was very interested in the work of Gestalt Psychology.  
This is an important point for the questions treated here, regarding the importance of 
cultural categories and their relationship either to language or perception (PALMER, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Generally, and beyond the specificities and differences, they share the idea that those kinds of models 
are not to be thought as composed by “componential traits”, or even that they take into account the 
profoundly visual dimension, against an “abstract” and “nonfigurative” attitude, nor in a static way: 
but they are composed by basic configurations of action, in which sub-categories, connected to each 
other, (for instance, “trajectories”, or “paths” or “processes” and “landmarks”, and where agents are 
involved). Those schemas can be chained together, and can become prototypes for describing and 
perceiving and cognitively recognize situations of action and meaning. 
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ib.: 12-13). Whorf, in developing his well-known theory (often, it must be said, 
object of simplifications and misunderstandings, in the name of a stereotyped 
comparison between relativism and anti-relativism; see, about this, PALLOTTI 
1998) – grammatical categories of a language are intrinsically linked to the 
categories of the particular cultural world to which that language belongs – 
considered such categories as “prisms” that allow us to observe the world from 
different perspectives (see also, JANDA 2006). 
For Whorf, these “prismatic” categories, these semiotic-cultural filters, must be 
studied through concrete examples of languages in use. That is, the description of 
typical situations in which one recognizes the relationships between elements within 
schemas either semantical or grammatical. According to Whorf, the study of these 
relationships (for example, in one of the well known cases studied by Whorf (1956), 
Shawnee language and the relation between the subject of an action and its enclosing 
space) shows similar mechanisms, like those of “figure-background relationship” 
studied by Gestalt Psychology. In this way, according to Palmer, Whorf has 
anticipated the analysis and building of “schemas” of scholars such as Lakoff and 
Talmy (ib.). 
This seems to be an interesting and important point (sometimes underestimated in the 
discussion about the culturalist perspective), because this apparent paradox (the 
search for patterns of perception by the culturalist approach) reverberates 
immediately in the issue we are dealing with here. In fact, a sort of “determinism” in 
the cultural approach has been too often emphasized in discussions. This approach, 
according to some critics, apparently insisting on the relativism of cultural 
differences and changes, could in reality bring with it in this sort of paradoxical 
deterministic attitude: cultural categories would explain perception, cognition, and 
language itself. This is an often proposed version of the so-called Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis, in its so-called “weak” version (see, for a discussion, PALLOTTI, ib.; 
GUMPERZ, LEVINSON 1991; EVERETT 2005). The culturalist approach, perhaps, 
has been presented in a too deterministic, or, sometimes, a priori and dogmatic way. 
However, the other issue, which is again at the center of the discussion today, 
regarding both language that cognition, was not taken sufficient account. This issue 
concerns the problem of “emergence of categories”: the creation of categorial 
systems that allow us to connect and act in the “world-environment” in which we 
live.  
So it might be more correct to speak of a “neo-culturalist” point of view (taking into 
account, of course, as we have seen, the work of cognitive and linguist science in the 
past decade). 
As stressed above, many of the current discussions on the topic of “embodiment”, 
and regarding the link between perceptual categories (in particular spatial forms of 
perception, and representation of the body, as we have seen, either works by Varela, 
or, Lakoff and Johnson (ib.)) derive from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. And 
again Merleau-Ponty, just like Whorf, considered Gestalt psychology’s results 
essential to his work. In this direction, regarding the emergence of categories (image 
schemas, figures, primary metaphors, conceptual schemes) from bodily dimension, 
and even on the undeniable links between it and the sensory-motor mechanism, 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 77) state: 
 
conceptual structure arises from our sensorimotor experience and the neural 
structures that give rise to it. The very notion of “structure” in our conceptual 
system is characterized by such things as image schemas and motor schemas. 
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Mental structures are intrinsically meaningful by virtue of their connection to 
our bodies and our embodied experience. They cannot be characterized 
adequately by meaningless symbols. 
 
This cognitive linguistic approach (besides the criticism of a traditional and 
antiquated symbolic–computational conception of the mind) is apparently far from a 
culturalist position. But it is precisely the issue of experience, of “experientialism”, 
with the question of the emergence of categories, that makes not only this 
“embodied” conception compatible with the culturalist idea (as long as it is used, we 
repeat, not in a dogmatic and aprioristic but dynamic sense) but also seems to enrich 
the idea of perceptual-bodily dimension (see JANDA, cit.6).  
It could be interesting, therefore, to try to find a link to recent research regarding 
visual perception. In an effort to construct visual perception models, some research, 
conducted halfway between mathematics and neuroscience7, have suggested 
examples of models that attempt to describe the functional architecture of the visual 
cortex (as those described, for instance, by SARTI, CITTI, MANFREDINI 2003; see 
also, CITTI, SARTI 2008; SARTI, CITTI, PETITOT 2008). These models (starting 
also from Petitot’s studies, see PETITOT 2002; PETITOT, TONDUT 1999)8 hope to 
create a new relationship between phenomenology and theory of perception (linked 
to linguistic-semiotic research), and functional architecture of visual cortex. 
These models seem to suggest that there are some common features and functions in 
different “activities” of perception such as: the vision ability to discriminate 
discontinuous elements from a continuous background (recognition, “lifting”); 
grouping and connecting discontinuous lines (completion); or even the ability to 
select for a given point in space, a reference system (orientation). These would be 
functions deal with the same geometry of the visual cortex (where, according to these 
assumptions, geometric-topological models would be “implemented”). 
According to this hypothesis, the functional structures of the brain (e.g., visual 
cortex) not only “translate” the signals from the sensory systems (retina, optic nerve, 
etc.), but also perform the real work of “production” of perceptual results (of which 
well known phenomena such as the completion of contours, or recognition of the 
orientation and direction of lines, or, perceived overlaps between figures, would be 
typical examples).  
                                                           
6
 Janda says: «Linguistic output is not a direct expression of reality. There are several “prisms” 
through which information must pass before a speaker pronounces an utterance. Our sensory 
perception organs of necessity filter out some information from our observable environment, and 
already as information is being perceived it is conceptually categorized for storage and retrieval. 
Indeed the acts of perception and conception are concurrent and cannot be meaningfully separated, a 
fact that led Talmy (1996) to coin “ception” as an umbrella term for the per-/conceptual process. 
Beyond “ception”, we must recognize that any information can be subject to various construals, and 
furthermore that linguistic utterances present more than observations on perceived reality: they can 
express mental states, imagined scenes, hypotheses, and pragmatic intentions» (JANDA 2006: 3). 
7
 Research Group on “Neuro-mathematics of visual cognition”, which, among other projects, won the 
“University strategic project” competition 2005-2008, (Institute for Advanced Studies, ISA, 
University of Bologna). For references to some of the participants’ work in this group, SARTI, CITTI, 
MANFREDINI 2003; CITTI, SARTI 2008. 
8
 And in which Petitot refers to either classical studies on theory of forms and vision, such as those of 
Kanizsa, or to research on the topological and functional organization of the retina (retinotopia) and 
the visual cortex (for example, with the studies of Hubel and Wiesel (60s Nobel prizes), on the 
discovery of nerve cells sensitive to the orientation of the lines, or those of Field and Hayes on 
contours completion). 
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For semiotics and language sciences these proposals seem quite interesting, and rich, 
even in perspective. For instances, assumptions about the constitution and generation 
of meaning in semiotic research, were sometimes thought in a perhaps aprioristic 
way, in which category production started from a “segmentation from the 
continuum” (see, i.e., ZILBERBERG 1981; ECO 1984: 52-53). On the contrary, this 
kind of research may open a possible alternative: as we pointed out, the perceptual 
activity becomes a “production” of perception itself, the generation of forms 
accompanying their own perception through the relationship of micro levels (local, 
“detecting” of simple elements) to their macro-integrations (by construction of entire 
“scenes” and perceptive figures), up to the possible emergence of real complex 
configurations and therefore categories of meaning.  
But, once again, what does this have to do with the question we posed in this essay, 
namely with the “cultural” dimension? Nothing seems further away from a culturalist 
approach than this kind of research. Indeed, some of these scholars are openly 
inclined to a “naturalization” (for example, particularly Petitot, cf., PETITOT, 
VARELA, ROY 1999) of the study of linguistic, perceptual and cognitive 
phenomena; while others seem more open to the prospect of exchange and dialogue 
with the culturalist approach. However, the key point is not, in our opinion, to decide 
on one position or another, but rather the re-evaluating the issue at stake: once more 
the problem of “emergence of categories”. 
Let us look at if and how this bridge could be built, and to discuss how to “fill the 
gap” between culturalist approach and studies on perception. 
 
 
4. “Filling the gap”? But which kind of “gap” between culture and perception? 
Identification of the reference systems and enunciation: an example. 
We return to our central issue, a new culturalist approach, by looking some of 
Palmer’s examples (1996). The phenomenon of spatial localization in relation to 
reference systems, produces not only the perception of distance, location of objects, 
cognition of relationships, but can also give rise to the narration of events, with 
metaphorical and conceptual effects. Palmer (cit.: 240-243), resumes Talmy (1988, 
2000) and his “force dynamics” model (about how forces and antagonisms are 
constituted and represented within language and discourse). As an example he shows 
how a simple sentence like “The shed kept standing despite the gale wind blowing 
against it” may produce the sense of a subject, of course, not anthropomorphic (the 
shed) that is facing (resisting in a position, then in a space) an antagonist (strong 
wind). This series of transformations introduces, firstly, the question of the observer's 
perspective through which we glimpse the description of reality. The spatial 
categories (with the tools offered by the unfolding of languages, such as deictic, 
anaphoric and pronominal systems) are never isolated elements: they participate in 
the staging of real scenes of action, made of first and second plans, they are entities 
that move along the trajectories of these plans interacting with each other, according 
to certain points of view. 
These ways of organizing action scenes, favor, as Palmer insists, the emergence and 
recognition of narrative organizations: where they start to build roles, functions, and, 
finally, action plans, scenarios, tactics and strategies that are more or less tacitly 
recognized and attributed to the different participants, in a given scene of action (see 
also, about this, GREIMAS 1983). In this sense, taken together with Lakoff and 
Johnson’s patterns (also quoted by Palmer), Palmer’s approach insists on the fact that 
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models and schemas are co-produced in concrete practices of social and cultural life, 
and inside talking-participants’ experience.  
We are faced with a set of phenomena that are usually defined in linguistics and 
semiotics as enunciation and discourse production (DUCROT 1983; GREIMAS, 
COURTÉS 1979; FONTANILLE 1999). Differentiation, allocation of roles, 
grouping of functions, are all operations, that therefore produce discourses and 
practices, and concrete ways of organizing meaning and sense. 
Could we then find possible homologies, with regard to these processes and 
operations, or correlations to the “micro” process levels of perception building as 
reconstructed by neuro-mathematical models of vision? Maybe. Some scholars (such 
as Lakoff and Johnson themselves) seem to go in this direction. Others, like Palmer 
(and generally the field of cultural linguistics and anthropology, see also, on space 
orientation, HAVILAND, i.e., 1996) are inclined to believe that categorial forms and 
patterns are set up by socio-cultural practices. Our impression is that new dialogue 
and exchange between these two fields of research is still possible. In any case, 
limiting the discussion to linguistic-semiotic research, we can describe discursive 
production modes as means of spatial category deployment, and organizations and 
links between semantic categories: between concepts and forms of content 
articulation. Researchers working on phenomena related to semantic categorization, 
particularly on spatial schemas are very insistent on this point: these categorial 
organizations are translated  (as well as prototypes of concepts or models for action) 
even in representations of dynamic forms and forces, in “intensities” that often are 
extended from general schemas to concrete psychological and social situations (see 
Palmer, cit.). Many scholars who have studied utterance and discourse theory, from 
Benveniste (1966, 1974) to Ducrot (1983), have insisted on this point. Language, in 
its concrete speech and present discourse construction, produces “forces” (and we 
must remember the reference made by these authors to Austin’s speech acts theory), 
and these same forces are constitutive of social scenes, as pointed out by Palmer and 
Talmy. 
For instance, as it has been stressed (see Ducrot, cit.), an utterance that acts like “a 
promise” has to be considered as such, not because it “represents” something, but 
because of the fact it produces and “makes something” (between two people, for 
example). For similar reasons, some spatial organizations and language categories 
are also clearly constitutive of socio-cultural and psychological constraints. In which 
way can we find a link between this dimension of enunciation forces, their 
translation in dynamic relationships, and the problem of visual perception (or even 
the recognition of objects and boundaries)? Here the issue concerns the wider idea of 
“vision” and its essential connection with the question of categorial constructions. 
De Certeau (1990), as a scholar at the frontier of semiotics, anthropology, history and 
linguistics, is among those who have insisted on the indissoluble links between 
socio-cultural and psycho-cultural relationships, and spatial categorial organizations. 
Grammatical, semantic and pragmatic elements participate to these relationships, 
with their linkage capability. The creation of spatial meanings cannot be easily 
separated from more general cultural categories. The problem is not “just” purely 
spatial but also “vectorial”, in the sense of understanding orientation and the 
relationship of actions (as we have seen with the example taken from Palmer). What 
we perceive is spatial categories that are closely associated with mechanisms of 
social and psychological significance; the spatial forms take on the cultural. When 
language becomes discourse, a game of ideological positions is deployed within the 
incapsulation of scenes and different frames. This recalls De Certeau’s “theatrical 
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dimension” of concrete forms of utterance and speech production. Discourse is an 
arena, a space where subjects play and interpret dramatic interchanges and 
negotiations. 
 
 
5. Conclusions. 
Emergence, completion, recognition of spatial reference systems are perceptual 
processes that (though different from each other) seem also to be involved in 
enunciation practices. But such practices include spatiality forms that are not just 
“empty boxes”, or abstract models, but are “inhabited” by agents/actors (see TYLEN 
2007). These actors interact with each other in roles (such as observers or points of 
view), or in activities of exchange which are at once physical, perceptual and 
semiotic. 
Although this idea may seem risky, especially if placed in relation to neuro-
mathematical models of spatial perception, we are proposing a combined hypothesis. 
This proposal would hold together the different ways of constructing meanings from 
spatial categories through several layers that gradually overlap from level to level. 
Among these layers, of course, there may be discontinuities and jumps. However if 
we refer to Hjelmslev’s “La stratification du langage” (HJELMSLEV 1953), the 
hypothesis is that sense and meaning are given by levels that overlap, translate and 
chase each other on, from the level of “collective appreciation” layers (to quote 
Hjelmslev’ words, ib.), up to psycho-physical or biological processes, thus belonging 
to neuro-perceptual domain and mechanisms. An antireductionist model, which 
would provide continuous feedback effects between the different levels; a model of 
production of sense that would have the form, as it has been said, of a sort of 
“millefeuille cake”: where the different levels and layers would be compounds of 
mechanisms and production processes of visual and sensorial perception, gradually 
until to their re-translation in dynamical forms of psychological, cultural and social 
significance. 
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